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IBE IMPORTANCE OF BEING BIASED
Anthony M. Dillofl'
PUNISHING HATE:

B IAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW.
By
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1999.

Frederick M. Lawrence.
Pp. xi, 269. $39.95.

The war against bias crimes is far from finished. In contrast, the
battle over bias-crime laws is largely over. Bias-crime laws, as com
monly formulated, increase the penalties for crimes motivated by bias.
The Supreme Court has held that such laws do not violate the First
Amendment.1 Virtually every state has enacted some sort of bias
crime law.2 Even the federal government, which may consider itself
without power to enact a general bias-crime law,3 has made bias a

* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. A.B. 1981,
Harvard; J .D. 1985, LL.M. 1996, Columbia. - Ed.

1. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 476 {1993). Some bias-crime laws may be
open to challenge on other constitutional grounds. In State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485 (N.J.),
cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 {1999), the New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed a law that made
bias a sentencing factor that would increase the maximum sentence to which a defendant is
subject. According to the defendant, this law violated the Due Process Clause's guarantee
that every sentence increasing fact be found by a jury under the reasonable doubt standard.
The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected this contention based on its interpretation of
Supreme Court precedent. See id. at 493-95. The United States Supreme Court will rule on
the constitutionality of the New Jersey law this year. The constitutionality of the New Jersey
law is far from certain. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251-52 {1999) (finding it
unsettled whether all sentence-range maximizing facts must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt). Even if the New Jersey law is struck down, however, states will be free to enforce
bias-crime laws in which the existence of bias is not treated as a sentencing factor, but as an
offense element to be proven at trial. Apprendi thus concerns the manner in which states
will be required to establish the existence of bias, not the constitutionality of bias-based pen
alty enhancements generally.
2 See The Staff of the Syracuse Journal of Legislation & Policy, Crimes Motivated by
Hatred: the Constitutionality and Impact of Hate Crime Legislation in the United States, 1
SYRACUSE J. LEGIS. & POL'Y, 29, 37 {1995) (reporting that, as of 1995, bias-crime legislation

of some sort had been enacted by 47 states) [hereinafter Staff].
3. Congress is undoubtedly aware of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence restricting its
power to criminalize conduct, see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 {1995) (striking down
an act making carrying a gun in a school zone a federal offense), and has been informed that
its power to enact general bias-crime legislation is doubtful. See The Hate Crimes Prevention
Act of 1998: Hearing on S.J. Res. 1529 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 39-44 {1998) (testimony of Lawrence Alexander, Professor of Law, University of San
Diego) (urging that Congress lacks authority under the Commerce Clause and the
Thirteenth Amendment's Enforcement Clause to enact a general bias-crime law).
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sentence-aggravating factor for the range of federal criminal offenses.4
Bias-crime laws thus are an established feature of the legal landscape.
Against this background, Frederick Lawrence5 has written
Punishing Hate: Bias Crimes Under American Law. Punishing Hate is
not a work of radical vision. It blazes no new trails in its method or its
conclusions. Rather, it is a careful reconstruction of reasons and ar
guments underlying the current consensus approval of bias-crime laws.
Accepting that bias should matter for the criminal law, it implies a bet
ter theory is needed of why bias should matter, and seeks to provide
that theory.
To explain the importance of being biased, Lawrence analyzes
bias-crime laws within the context of traditional moral theories and or
thodox First Amendment concerns. He cogently explains the basic
form and function of bias-crime laws, offers some useful refinements
for their formulation, vigorously defends their moral soundness and
constitutionality, and forcefully advocates their adoption by the fed
eral government. Throughout, Lawrence displays an unwavering
commitment to the ideal of equality, never leaving his readers in
doubt as to where his sympathies lie. Occasionally voyaging into so
phisticated areas of moral philosophy, criminal theory and federal ju
risprudence, Lawrence presents his subjects with accessible, deliber
ate, and sometimes stirring prose. Punishing Hate also includes a
number of extensive and well-researched appendices making the book
a useful scholarly tool. Thus, Lawrence has written what may come to
be regarded a classic liberal treatment of bias crimes and the laws gov
erning them.
To say that Lawrence has presented a classic liberal treatment of
'his topic, however, is not to say that his valorizing of bias-crime laws
will persuade the as-yet unconverted. Encompassing a variety of in
dependent ideals, liberalism6 occasionally yields merely plausible an
swers to difficult social issues. As will be discussed, Lawrence in
Punishing Hate often seems to give unjustified priority to the ideal of
equality. When the moral issues concerning desert become controver
sial, when the empirical evidence concerning social impact becomes
thin, when the proper formulation of a law becomes debatable, when
4. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 3Al.l(a) (1998-99). Section 3Al.l(a)
provides:
If the finder of fact at trial . . . determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant in
tentionally selected any victim or any property as the object of the offense of conviction be
cause of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, dis
ability, or sexual orientation of any person, increase by 3 levels.

5. Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
6. By "liberalism," I refer to a range of positions distinguished by .their commitment to
the rule of law, political and intellectual freedom, toleration, opposition to racial and sexual
discrimination, and respect for the rights of individuals. See Jeremy Waldron, Liberalism, in
5 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 598 (Edward Craig ed., 1998).
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the commands of the Constitution become unclear, when the meaning
expressed by an official act becomes ambiguous, Lawrence is willing to
let the rhetorical appeal of equality carry the day. Thus, while
Lawrence does not settle for simplistic answers to the questions he
asks, he often does not ask the hardest questions.
Intellectually, bias crimes are located at the intersection of sociol
ogy, moral philosophy, criminal justice, American history, clinical psy
chology, and cultural studies. Punishing Hate thus attempts to cover
an enormously complex topic in relatively few pages. Lawrence's
strategy is to concentrate on the issues of greatest concern to his in
tended audience: the interested layperson, the lawyer, and the legisla
tor. In this Review, I shall strategically limit myself to discussing the
three major issues of concern to Lawrence: the justification of bias
crime laws, the constitutionality of bias-crime laws, and the role of the
federal government in prosecuting bias-crimes.
I.

THE JUSTIFICATION OF BIAS-CRIME LAWS

In Chapter Three, Lawrence examines the central normative ques
tion: Are the increased penalties provided by bias-crime laws morally
justified? Lawrence answers this question by applying both traditional
consequentialist/utilitarian and deontological/retributive theories of
punishment to bias-crime laws. Although such theories reflect deep
philosophical differences, in practice they often converge. Both theo
ries recognize that, generally speaking, the greater the harm associated
with a criminal act, the greater the appropriate penalty. Likewise,
both theories recognize that the mental state of the perpetrator is
relevant in determining the magnitude of the penalty. There may, of
course, be instances where consequentialist concerns for deterrence or
incapacitation would authorize greater penalties than those recom
mended by desert-based forms of retributivism. Because such results
are arguably unjust, Lawrence rejects a pure utilitarian theory of
punishment in favor of a mixed theory, i.e., a utilitarian theory of
punishment with desert-based side-constraints (p. 50). He then ex
amines bias crimes in light of the mental states and harms associated
with them. As discussed below, he concludes that both pure retribu
tive and mixed theories of punishment support bias-crime laws.7

7. Lawrence's conclusion in Chapter Three that bias-crime laws are warranted is am
biguous at best. Lawrence writes, "[Chapter 3] argues that bias crimes ought to receive
punishment that is more severe than that imposed for parallel crimes." P. 45. To support
this claim, Lawrence invokes both positive retributivist as well as mixed theories of punish
ment. Pp. 46, 50. These theories purport to recommend when a particular punishment
ought to be imposed. Nevertheless, Lawrence later characterizes his discussion as merely
establishing that enhanced penalties may be imposed, not that they ought to be imposed. P.
161.
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Lawrence begins with a deontological justification based on the
bias criminal's mental state.8 According to Lawrence, this deontologi
cal justification is the one espoused by "most supporters" of bias
crime laws (p. 61). This justification asserts that bias criminals are
more deserving of punishment than other criminals without appealing
to the independent contingent premise that bias crimes cause greater
harm than similar crimes not motivated by bias ("parallel crimes").
The justification begins with the unassailable premise that those who
kill intentionally are more blameworthy, and hence more deserving of
punishment, than those who kill negligently (p. 60) . Likewise, so goes
the argument, bias criminals are more blameworthy than other crimi
nals. Why should bias criminals be especially blameworthy by virtue
of their motivation? Lawrence explains that "[t]he motivation of the
bias-crime offender violates the equality principle, one of the most
deeply held tenets in our legal system and our culture" (p. 61).
It is unclear to what extent Lawrence endorses this most widely es
poused justification of bias crimes. Lawrence states the justification
with implicit approval. Elsewhere in the book, he expresses similar
sentiments (pp. 38-39, 75). In explaining the grounds for bias-crime
laws, however, Lawrence often refers to only justifications based on
increased harms associated with bias crime (pp. 4, 5, 40, 45, 80, 95,

175).
Lawrence is sensible to de-emphasize this deontological justifica
tion of enhanced penalties. It is flawed. From a deontological per
spective, mental states generally are considered relevant to blamewor
thiness because they speak to the responsibility of the offender for her
wrongful act.9 Purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence are
the four organizing mental states of the Model Penal Code.10 They
8. I pass over Lawrence's discussion of the consequentialist significance of the bias
criminal's mental state. Rather than looking at traditional consequentialist issues such as the
bias criminal's susceptibility to general deterrence or need for incapacitation, Lawrence ar
gues that bias motivation is associated with more brutal crintes. P. 60. The argument, thus,
relies on the harmfulness of bias crintes relative to other crintes, a topic Lawrence treats
(and I discuss) in greater detail later.
Lawrence advances an additional consequentialist argument based on mental states.
According to Lawrence, just as intentional vehicular homicide should be punished more
than negligent vehicular homicide because negligent driving has some positive social value
(where no accident occurs), so bias crintes should be punished more than other intentional
crintes. P. 60. This is unconvincing. Unlike negligent conduct, the conduct involved in in
tentional crintes, whether motivated by bias or not, generally has no positive social value.
Thus, no distinction should be made between bias and other intentional crintes. Lawrence's
argument needs much greater elaboration.
9. See generally Michael S. Moore, Printa Facie Moral Culpability, 76 B.U. L.
319-25 (1996) (explicating relevance of mental states to culpability).

REV. 319,

10. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1962). The Model Penal Code does not explic
itly define "negligently" as a mental state. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d). Never
theless, a mental state is supposed. In order to be negligent with respect to a material ele
ment, a person must be aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to be aware of a
substantial risk that a material element exists.
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serve to establish the precise degree of responsibility the wrongdoer
bears for the harm she has caused. An actor who rationally, inten
tionally, and deliberately commits an assault based on racial bias is no
more responsible for the assault than one who similarly commits an
assault based on greed. They both are, we might say, maximally re
sponsible for the wrong of assault and so are equally blameworthy. Of
course, the greed-driven offender merely knows the race of his victim
and so is not as responsible for his victim's being of a particular race.
A bias criminal is exactly a criminal who may be held fully account
able not only for causing harm, but also for the harm's being caused to
a victim of a certain identifiable group. The group identity of the vic
tim, however, is irrelevant to the wrongfulness of the assault. African
Americans, for example, have no greater right not to be assaulted than
whites and, as a general matter, deserve no greater protection.11 A
person who intentionally assaults an African American is not thereby
responsible for a greater right violation than a person who commits an
intentional assault indifferent to the race of his victim. Bias motiva
tion does not increase the perpetrator's responsibility for any morally
relevant aspect of the assault.12
On some accounts, however, mental states are relevant to blame
worthiness not because they imply greater responsibility for a harm,
but because they reflect the flawed character that is the underlying
cause of the crime.13 By rejecting the equality principle - "one of the
most deeply held tenets in our legal system and our culture" (p. 61) 
the bias criminal, it may be argued, reveals his character to be more
deeply flawed than that of the ordinary criminal.14
Without taking a position on the general validity of character theo
ries of punishment, I do not believe that such theories provide support
for bias-crime laws. The equality principle does not appear to possess
the privileged position that Lawrence ascribes to it.
Although
11. Bias-crime laws protect all groups equally. A law that provided enhanced penalties
for crimes against only those of a particular racial or religious group likely would offend
principles of substantive equality. I do not know any advocates of such group-specific laws,
and I do not understand Lawrence as supporting bias-crime laws on the ground that they are
covert minority-protection laws.
12. This point, like many others raised in this Review, is more fully developed in my ar
ticle on bias-crime laws. See Anthony M. Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examination of the
Theoretical Foundations ofBias Crime Statutes, 91 NW. L. REV. 1015 (1997).

13. See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Choice, Character, and Criminal Liability, 12 L. & PHIL. 345, 362
(1993) ("The proper focus of the criminal process is not, the 'character' theorist argues, on
the particular actions for which a defendant is formally convicted and sentenced, but on
some character-trait that his criminal act revealed."); Michael S. Moore, Choice, Character,
and Excuse, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring 1990, at 29, 31-40.

14. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, The State's Interest in Retribution, 283 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
283, 285 (1994) (characterizing bias-crime laws as punishing in response to a person's
particularly great inner wickedness); see also Paul H. Robinson, Hate Crimes: Crimes of
Motive, Character, or Group Terror?, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 605, 609 (considering,
ISSUES

but rejecting, such a theory asfoconsistent with traditional criminal law theory).
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Lawrence does not explicitly define it, the equality principle roughly
appears to be the principle that individuals should be treated without
regard to race, color, religion, or other characteristics that historically
have been the basis for widespread discrimination (pp. 11-20). So de
fined, this principle has ascended undoubtedly in importance in our
culture and legal system in recent decades. Yet it is only one among
many important ideals. Our culture and legal system equally cherish
the principles of fairness, human dignity, autonomy, altruism, reci
procity, forgiveness, loyalty, and self-expression to cname a few.
Sadists, wife-beaters, loan sharks, child molesters, drug pushers, and
their ilk generally act on motives as abhorrent as bias and generally
have characters that are equally flawed. The standard penalty levels
are believed sufficient to deliver the punishments they deserve. They
should be sufficient for bias criminals as well.
Lawrence's harm-based analysis is more convincing. In arguing
that bias crimes cause greater harms than parallel crimes, Lawrence
takes both an ex ante and an ex post perspective on bias crimes.15 Ex
ante, Lawrence contends, a rational person would prefer to be the vic
tim of a parallel crime because of the deep psychological harm that
bias crimes may inflict (pp. 61-62). Is this correct? Deep psychologi
cal harm can be caused by perceived attacks on one's identity or sense
of self. Some people's identities are based primarily on their race and
religious affiliations. Other people's however are based on their fam
ily, hobbies, profession, ties to their community, commitments to sport
teams, their college, state, and so on. Most people in our pluralistic
and polymorphous culture define themselves by reference to many in
dependent categories. I, for example, am a law professor, a Mets fan,
a person of Ukrainian extraction, a cat owner, and an advocate of
abortion rights. If, one day, I found the tires of my- car slashed, I am
not at all sure that, ex ante, I would prefer to learn that the perpetra
tor was a student appalled at my teaching ability, a law professor of
fended by my review of his book, a radical anti-abortion activist, or a
crazed Yankees fan who wanted to strike out at my team. Each sce
nario carries its particular pain.
Indeed, it is deeply disconcerting to be the target of "random"
violence. I remember being mugged as a teenager one night by a
group of older teens who, in retrospect, probably had nothing better to
do that night. As their blows rained down, I recall being overcome by
the sheer senselessness of why I, a completely anonymous person to
them, would be the target of their aggression. An explanation of any
type, even one that included the despicable proposition "they think
Jews deserve it" might have been more satisfying than contending
with the unanswerable existential question "Why me?" As Lawrence
15. Lawrence does not discuss the relation of these perspectives. It is not clear whether
he believes they are equivalent or, if they diverge, which should control.
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recognizes, bias crimes are crimes based neither on relatively unique
attributes of the individual (such as past personal relations with the
perpetrator) nor extremely common characteristics (such as carrying a
wallet) (pp. 9, 62). The characteristics on which bias crimes are based,
for example race and religion, fall somewhere in between. Lawrence,
however, does not explain why crimes based on such middle-level
characteristics result in "unique humiliation" (p. 62). Although in one
passage, Lawrence theorizes that minority victims of bias crimes exp\!-:
rience attacks as forms of racial stigmatization (p. 41), elsewhere he
undercuts that theory by citing evidence that minority victims of bias
crime do not experience greater psychological trauma than white bias
crime victims (p. 40).
More persuasive is Lawrence's harm-analysis from an ex post per
spective. Here, Lawrence relies on newspaper accounts and sociologi
cal studies documenting the feeling of depression and anxiety among
bias-crime victims (pp. 63, 224 n.66). These works, however, suffer
from baseline questions. Bias-crime victims may suffer greater psy
chological harms, but compared to whom? As offenses vary greatly in
circumstance and participants, there are likely many categories of vic
tims of a given offense who also suffer greater depression and anxiety
than the average offense victim. Those assaulted on holidays, by alco
holics, by spouses, in prisons, in public, or the complementary sets of
victims, may experience greater than average psychological harm. As
Lawrence recognizes, the criminal law can operate only with a small
number of levels of felonies and misdemeanors (p. 56). Thus, to jus
tify an enhanced range of punishments, bias crimes must form a rela
tively tight class of crimes resulting in special psychological damage.
None of the research cited by Lawrence compares bias crimes with
other potentially psychologically harmful subclasses of parallel crimes
- such as assaults based on sadism, gang-violence, random victim se
lection, political affiliation, or intense personal animosity - all of
which can be accommodated, it is thought, under the standard set of
penalty levels.16
There is a further, generally unnoticed, issue associated with
Lawrence's claim that the greater psychological harm suffered by bias16. Studies cited by Lawrence, such as Joan C. Weiss, Ethnoviolence: Impact upon and
Response of Victims and the Community, in BIAS CRIME: AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND LEGAL REsPONSES 174, 182 (1993), only compare bias crime to the general category of
"personal" crimes.
There is a second baseline question. It is not clear that the degree of physical violence is
held constant when the psychological impacts of bias and parallel crimes are compared. Bias
crimes tend to be more violent than parallel crimes (p. 39). Their greater violence, rather
than their victims' perceptions of bias motivation, could explain their greater psychological
impact. Moreover, the statistically greater physical violence involved in bias crimes does not
justify treating these crimes separately as a uniquely penalized class of offenses; the standard
set of criminal laws and penalty ranges is thought already sufficient to accommodate the
subclass of particularly violent instances of crime.
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crime victims justifies the harsher punishment of bias criminals.
as used in either consequentialist or retributive theories, is a
concept with a normative component. Not every unwanted occur
rence constitutes a harm that justifies deterring the conduct that pro
duced the unwanted occurrence. Likewise, not every setback of inter
ests constitutes a harm that is relevant to determining the punishment
an actor deserves.17 For example, if a man is greatly disturbed by the
knowledge that his neighbor reads heretical literature on Sunday, this
disturbance should not be recognized as a harm for purposes of pun
ishment. One way to reach this conclusion is to reason in a Rawlsian
manner that self-interested individuals who value liberty would not
agree in advance to restrictions on intellectual liberty based on the po
tentially unlimited sensitivity of second parties.18 Another way to
reach the conclusion is to rely on the basic moral premise that it is
simply no business of one person what another reads - a person has a
sphere of privacy and others have no claim to control what goes on
within that sphere.19 One's thoughts, to the extent they do not evi
dence future wrongdoing, are arguably within such a sphere.20 Our
thoughts are paradigmatically private matters. They help define who
we are and reflect only our subjective beliefs and values. It would be
generally conceded that adhering to racism as an abstract principle or
even engaging in generally lawful and innocuous activities because of
one's racism, such as closing one's store to honor Hitler's birthday,
should not be grounds for punishment even if the fact of one's racism
or the racist reason for one's action may greatly disturb another.21 In
deed, the appreciation that such actions are another's, and hence not

Harm,

17. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 31-36 {1984) {distinguishing setbacks from
harms and noting that a sense of harm carries nonnative implications).
18. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE ch. III {1971 ).
19. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 {1969) (invalidating a state statute prohib
iting possession of obscene materials in the privacy of the home).
20. The claim to dominion over one's own thoughts has Lockean roots. See JOHN
Second Treatise of Government § 27, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter
Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967); see also Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Prop
erty, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 78 (1997) {"If we have the rights to control anything, it is the
contents of our minds."); III Lysander Spooner, The Law ofIntellectual Property: or An Es
LOCKE,

say on the Right of Authors and Inventors to a Perpetual Property in Their Ideas, in THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF LYSANDER SPOONER 58 {Charles Shively ed., 1971) ("Nothing is,
by its own essence and nature, more perfectly susceptible of exclusive appropriation, than a
thought.").

21. Concerning the feelings of outrage that one person's religious views might cause another, John Stuart Mill argued:
[T]here is no parity between the feeling of a person for his own opinion, and the feeling of
another who is offended at his holding it; no more than between the desire of a thief to take
a purse, and the desire of the right owner to keep it. And a person's taste is as much his own
peculiar concern as his opinion or his purse.

JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY WITH THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN AND CHAPTERS ON
SOCIALISM 84 {Stefan Collini ed., 1989) {1859).
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part of our individual identity, enables us to live with another's objec
tionable attitudes. Admittedly more controversial are cases where the
attitudes give rise to actions, such as bias crimes, that wrongfully im
pinge on others. Perhaps here, the victim has some claim to being
psychologically harmed by thoughts that generally are not cognizable
grounds for complaint. But there is a respectable normative argument
that only the conduct, or, at most, the intent to engage in the conduct,
is the legitimate concern of the victim.22 This argument undoubtedly is
bolstered by the proposition, advanced earlier,23 that motives relating
to race or other morally neutral characteristics do not increase the ac
tor's responsibility for a given wrong or manifest a worse character. If
a particular motive should not matter to a person determining the ac
tor's punishment, why should it matter to the person harmed? Fol
lowing this line of reasoning, the actor's motives, even if they generally
are of concern to the victim, should not be. One's legitimate area of
grievance ends where another's underlying thought processes begin.
Any complete inquiry into the moral justification of bias-crime laws
should address this issue.24
A further short-coming of Lawrence's attempt to justify bias-crime
laws is his failure to apply his theoretical justifications to either exist
ing bias-crime laws or his own model bias-crime law. It is fair to con
cede that bias crimes, generally speaking, create greater apprehension
in the target community and produce greater trauma in society at large
than crimes from other motivations. These effects, however, are dif
fuse. Compared to the other sorts of harms the criminal law seeks to
prevent, these effects are difficult to identify and quantify. In contrast,
the enhanced penalties authorized by bias-crime laws are concrete and
specific. Such laws cannot be considered justified unless the amount
of the additional penalty is justified. If the devil is in the details,
Lawrence's failure to deal with these details bedevils his argument. A
hypothetical bias-crime law that imposed a $20 fine in addition to the
penalty for the underlying crime likely would meet little objection
from those who believe that desert should place a ceiling on unjusti
fied punishment. A bias-crime law that imposed a mandatory addi
tional twenty-year penalty likely would be considered objectionable

22. It may be that "even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being
kicked." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 7 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
Belknap Press 1963) (1881). It is another question whether the dog cares what inadequate
reason motivated the kick.
23. See supra text accompanying notes 9-15.
24. In a later part of the book, Lawrence in fact distinguishes between an offense caused
by racial motivation and apprehension of future physical harm that may be caused by a bias
crime. He argues that, for the purpose of justifying bias-crime laws under the First Amend
ment, only the apprehension of future physical harm is relevant. P. 102. He does not, how
ever, elaborate on the grounds of the distinction, and it is not clear whether he thinks it re
flects a general moral principle as suggested above.
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by even hard-core supporters of bias-crime laws. In fact, the penalty
enhancements established by most bias-crime laws fall somewhere in
between.25
Lawrence concludes his book by offering a model bias-crime law
that is supposed to embody his considered opinions concerning the na
ture, scope, and necessity of bias-crime laws (pp. 170-71). Lawrence's
model law takes the not uncommon approach of providing for a pen
alty enhancement of one or two sentencing levels. Assuming a back
ground penal code like the Model Penal Code, Lawrence's model law
would authorize the punishment of a bias-motivated act of criminal
trespass resulting in a loss of under $25 at the level of an assault with a
deadly weapon; a simple assault based on bias at the level of an aggra
vated assault manifesting extreme indifference to human life; and a
bias assault with a deadly weapon as a murder.26 Even in qualitative
terms, these are significant penalty enhancements. To my mind, the
equivalences in desert they suggest are problematic.27 Lawrence ad
mits that his purpose is not to determine the precise amount of penalty
enhancement appropriate for every possible bias offense (pp. 222-30).
But unless he demonstrates that the appropriate penalty enhancement
is great enough to, at least, move a bias crime into the next highest
penalty level, he cannot claim to have presented a full defense of bias
crime laws.
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BIAS-CRIME LAWS

In Chapter Five, Lawrence asks "[a]re bias-crime laws constitu
tional" (p. 80)? The quick and easy answer, based on Wisconsin v.
Mitchell,28 is "yes." In Mitchell, the Supreme Court squarely held that
a Wisconsin statute establishing increased sentences for bias crimes
did not violate the First Amendment.29 Lawrence, however, does not
rest with the positive law orthodoxy of the current Court. Nor does he
attempt to work through the thicket of First Amendment cases and

25. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 480 (1993) (upholding a state bias
crime law that permitted a five-year sentencing enhancement).
26. See MODELPENAL CODE §§ 210.2, 211.1, 220.3 (1962).
27. Cf. Lawrence Crocker, Hate Crime Statutes: Just? Constitutional? Wise?, 1992/1993
SURV. AM. L. 485, 495 ("[M]y own intuition . . .[is] that it is excessive for an assault
that would otherwise receive a two-year sentence to receive instead a seven-year sen
tence . . . . ).

ANN.

"

28. 508U.S. 476 (1993).
29. Bias-crime laws are open to challenge on grounds other than the First Amendment.
Such challenges, however, are directed at only the procedures that implement bias-triggered
penalty enhancements, and so only contingently involve bias-crime laws. See supra note 1.
Lawrence reasonably limits his discussion of the constitutionality of bias-crime laws to their
consistency with the First Amendment and their arguably novel focus on motive.
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doctrine that the extensive literature on the topic engages.30 Rather,
Lawrence seeks to explore whether bias-crime laws are consistent with
the deep and well-established values and principles lying at the heart
of the First Amendment.31 Lawrence does not give these values and
principles short shrift. He portrays himself as a First Amendment
stalwart in his view that racist speech should be protected (p. 82).
Nevertheless, Lawrence ultimately concludes that bias-crime laws and
the First Amendment are consistent and that it is possible "both to
punish the bias criminal [pursuant to bias-crime laws] and to protect
the right of the bigot to express his beliefs" (p. 80). Lawrence thus
sets himself the project of distinguishing between bias crimes, which
may be subject to enhanced penalties, and bias speech, which may not.
This is a challenging project given that some speech may be criminal,
some criminal conduct may be expressive, and both may be motivated
by bias.

A

Bias-Crime Laws and Free Speech

Where does bias speech end and bias crime begin? To answer this
question, Lawrence proposes a "reformation" (p. 99) of the "fighting
words" doctrine. The fighting words doctrine, as it now exists, permits
the banning of words that tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace.32 Lawrence points out, however, that the doctrine, as it was
originally formulated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,33 permitted the
banning of, not only words that tended to incite an immediate breach
of the peace, but also those that by their very utterance inflicted in
jury. According to Lawrence, the Supreme Court, in choosing to em30. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Heath Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 762-64 (1994) (holding that
an injunction against anti-abortion protests was not improperly content based); Forsyth
County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992) (stating that listeners' reaction to
a speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S.
560 (1991) (considering the First Amendment protections of nude dancing); Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105-23 (1991) (invali
dating content-based regulation on speech intended to benefit crime victims); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (invalidating a state restriction on burning the American flag);
City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986) (discussing the signifi
cance of a legislative motive to suppress speech); California v. Cohen, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)
(recognizing the constitutional right to wear a jacket bearing an offensive slogan about the
draft).
31. Lawrence identifies "the right to free expression" as lying at the heart of our legal
culture. P. 80.
32 See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972) (defining fighting words as
"those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace" (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))). The scope of
the fighting words doctrine as it currently exists, is discussed in Melody L. Hurdle, Recent
Development, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul: The Continuing Confusion of the Fighting Words
Doctrine, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1143, 1174 (1994) (suggesting that fighting words should be de
fined in terms of their minimal contribution to the marketplace of ideas).
33. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
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phasize the first type of fighting words and ignore the second, took the
wrong path. Lawrence writes, "If Chaplinsky is to have any contem
porary vitality, it must be understood to place outside the First
Amendment's reach those words that are intended to and have the
likely effect of creating fear of injury in the addressee" (p. 102).
Lawrence, however, is careful to distinguish the fear of injury and the
mere wounding of feelings. "Words that have the intent to hurt the
addressee's feelings, even those that also have that effect, however un
fortunate, do not come under this understanding of fighting words" (p.
102). This distinction between words that portend harm and words
that merely wound feelings, not that between "conduct" and "speech,"
is the key to drawing the line between constitutionally proscribable
bias crimes and constitutionally protected hate speech. Thus,
Lawrence concludes, "Racially targeted actions that are intended to
create fear in the addressee and that are likely to do so may be treated
as bias crimes . . . . [R]acially targeted behavior that vents the actor's
racism is racial speech that is protected, even if it disturbs the observer
greatly" (p. 102).
It is not clear that Lawrence needs to reformulate the Supreme
Court's fighting words jurisprudence to get where he wants to go.
Words used to communicate realistic threats of violence - "Your
money or your life" - are uncontroversially subject to state control.
There are no serious First Amendment challenges to the tort of assault
or the crime of menacing even though words often are used in con
junction with other factors to perpetrate these unlawful acts. There
are, however, three difficulties with drawing the distinction between
proscribable conduct and protected speech along the lines Lawrence
suggests.
First, the distinction between racially targeted action that creates
fear of injury and racially targeted conduct that vents the actor's ra
cism is unsound. Racially motivated conduct may simultaneously cre
ate fear and vent racism. The distinction thus is as problematic as the
distinction between verbal acts ("speech") and nonverbal acts ("con
duct") that Lawrence rejects as inadequate to demarcate the
protected/proscribable boundary (pp. 89-92). Furthermore, racially
based conduct that may be proscribed (bias crimes) should not be
identified with acts that create fear of injury in the addressee. Under
most bias-crime laws,34 a white teenager who anonymously slashes the
tires of an African-American person's car because of bias commits a
bias crime even if he reasonably believes his act will be perceived as
one of random vandalism, not bias. If the enhanced punishment of
this act as a bias crime is constitutional, it cannot be because it in
volves the intent or effect of creating fear of injury in the addressee.

34. See Apps. B-E (presenting representative bias-crime laws).
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Second, Lawrence's identification of bias crimes with acts that are
intended to and will have the likely effect of creating fear of injury
does not extend sufficient protection to racially motivated expressive
conduct. The march of Nazi sympathizers in Skokie, Illinois might be
described as a " [r]acially targeted action[] that [is] intended to create
fear in the addressee and [is] likely to do so" (p. 102). Likewise, in the
1950s, the public advocacy of communism may have created in some
the fear of being injured in the course of a violent uprising. Such acts,
however, clearly are protected under the First Amendment.35 They
critically differ from assault and menacing because these latter acts, by
definition, require the creation of at least the fear of immediate in
jury.36 The First Amendment traditionally has required courts to con
sider the concreteness and temporal proximity of the threatened
harms.37 Are the fears of future injury caused by bias crimes closer to
the fears of immediate injury associated with assault and menacing or
the speculative fears associated with neo-Nazism or a possible
communist-inspired uprising? In the latter cases, the time frame, per
petrator, circumstances, and type of violence feared are indefinite and
unspecified. Likewise, the fear of injury, or "heightened sense of vul
nerability" (p. 40), that bias crimes create are indeterminate in these
respects. Just as the general apprehension generated by racist dema
goguery and demonstration should not support a prison term under
free speech principles, so the general apprehension produced by bias
crimes should not support an additional prison term.38

35. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 {1969) (striking down a law that criminalized
advocating violence to effect political reform); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (invalidating an ordinance that would have denied a parade
permit to a neo-Nazi group).
36.

See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.l{l){c) {1962); ALA.

KY. REV. STAT.

CODE § 13A-6-23 (1994);
§ 508.050 {1999); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-05 {1999); OR. REV. STAT. §

163.190 (1997).
37. The "clear and present danger" test can be seen in a chronology of Supreme Court
cases forming and incorporating the test. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per cu
riam) (reversing a conviction for a statement generally advocating lawlessness at an indefi
nite future time); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (per curiam) (stating
that advocacy, to be criminalized, must be "directed to inciting or producing imminent law
less action. . ."); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 {1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(requiring "clear and imminent danger of some substantive evil" for criminalization);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (introducing the "clear and present danger"
test). While the clear and present danger test has not always been applied vigorously by the
Supreme Court, see Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52, strong arguments can be made for the test's
theoretical soundness. See Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First
Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1159 (1982).
38. Lawrence's fear-based criterion for bias crimes is also too narrow. Lawrence writes,
"racially targeted behavior that vents the actor's racism is racial speech that is protected by
the First Amendment, even if it disturbs the observer greatly." P. 102. A racially targeted
assault may be behavior that vents the actor's racism, but it is not protected speech even in
the absence of the intent or effect to create fear in the addressee. The First Amendment
protects neither conduct nor speech, e.g., a bomb threat, that causes substantial direct harm.
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Finally, Lawrence's theory leaves bias-crime laws open to the criti
cism of being improperly content based. Even if bias crimes could be
subjected to significant penalties based on the fact that they, in causing
fear of injury, are analogous to fighting words, the question remains
whether bias crimes can be so singled out for enhanced penalization.
In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, the Supreme Court struck down a local
ordinance that prohibited cross burning and like acts that were likely
to cause alarm in others "on the basis of race, color creed, religion or
gender."39 The Court reasoned that although the ordinance banned
only fighting words, it violated the First Amendment because the ban
was limited to an improper content-defined subcategory of fighting
words (essentially bias-motivated fighting words).40 As Lawrence rec
ognizes, bias-crime laws might be open to similar challenges that they
are not appropriately content neutral (p. 105). In Mitchell, the Court
rejected such a challenge, in part, on the ground that bias-crime laws
regulated conduct and not speech and so were not content based.41
Lawrence, however, rejects as superficial the speech/conduct dis
tinction. He believes that bias crimes have an expressive aspect and,
as such, should be afforded the protection available to speech (pp. 8992). Lawrence thus accepts that the First Amendment's presumption
against content-based restrictions applies to bias-crime laws. Accord
ing to Lawrence, the proper inquiry is whether the state can "advance
a nonpretextual justification for the distinction drawn in its criminal
law, a justification that stands independent of any effort to suppress
the expression of ideas" (p. 104). Similarly, Lawrence writes, "[w]e
must ask whether bias crime statutes further an important interest un
related to the suppression of racist speech" (p. 106). Lawrence identi
fies three such interests: the need to deter a rapidly increasing form of
crime, the need to specifically deter a perpetrator with a high degree
of potential dangerousness, and the desire to address a crime that has
a particularly injurious effect on the victim, the targeted group, and
society at large (p. 106). Thus, based on considerations not very dif
ferent from those identified in Mitchell,42 Lawrence concludes that
bias-crime laws do not employ a constitutionally defective content
based distinction.

39. 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992).
40. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391-94.

41. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993).
42. 508 U.S. at 487-88. The Court stated that:

ff)he Wisconsin statute singles out for enhancement bias-inspired conduct because this con
duct is thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm. For example, according to the
State and its amici, bias-motivated crimes are more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, in
flict distinct emotional harms on their victims, and incite community unrest.
Id.
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Lawrence's defense of bias-crime laws is not satisfactory. As a
general matter, in order to defend bias-crime laws against the claim
that they are improperly content based, it is insufficient to show they
further an important state interest unrelated to the suppression of
speech. Such a showing entirely misses the point of the requirement
of content neutrality. Preserving the peace and tranquility of a resi
dential neighborhood is an important state interest unrelated to the
suppression of speech.43 An ordinance banning sound trucks that an
nounce the communist manifesto from residential neighborhoods ad
vances that interest. Nevertheless, the ordinance clearly would be an
unconstitutional content-based restriction. Because the interest ad
vanced does not explain why the ordinance is limited to a certain class
of peace-disrupting conduct, the interest appears pretextual.
More specifically, the three harm-based justifications advanced by
Lawrence have a disturbing air of pretext about them. Consider the
alleged need to deter a rapidly increasing form of crime. As Lawrence
recognizes, there is little solid evidence that the rate of bias crimes is
increasing rapidly. Lawrence writes, "it remains difficult . . . to gauge
whether the bias crime problem has actually worsened or merely ap
pears to have done so [due to heightened awareness of the problem] "
(p. 20). The issue is fogged by "incomplete data" (p. 24). The best ar
gument for an increase in bias crimes, Lawrence believes, is the his
torical parallel between bias-crime rates and conditions of economic
unrest (pp. 25-26). Characterizing the state of the current economy as
"adverse" (p. 26), Lawrence infers a relatively high rate of bias crimes
today. The general fall of the crime rate over the last few years,44
however, belies the supposition that qurrent economic conditions are
fertile ground for antisocial sentiment and behavior. Furthermore,
even assuming that the rising rate of bias crimes could be satisfactorily
established, there remains a serious problem with relying on this fact
as a nonpretextual justification. According to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's data for the period of 1985 to 1994, the rates of murder,
rape, robbery, aggravated assault, larceny, and car theft increased.45
Nevertheless, during that period, there was no across-the-board in-

43. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 {1980) {"The State's interest in protecting the
well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and
civilized society."); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 {1948) {implying that reasonable
time, manner, and place restrictions are permissible to regulate loudspeakers).
44. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE SOURCEBOOK
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1998, at 173 tbl.3.2 (1999) {describing the approxi
mately 22% and 25% drop in rates of personal and property crimes (respectively) from 1995
to 1998).
45. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES: 1997, at 201 tbl.313 {117th ed. 1997).
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crease in penalties. To single out bias crimes as being particularly in
need of increased penalties based on rising rates seems pretextual.46
Equally questionable is Lawrence's reliance on the need to specifi
cally deter perpetrators with a high degree of potential dangerousness.
Lawrence cites a study that found that assaults based on bias are more
than twice as likely to result in physical injury as other assaults (p. 39).
To the extent that bias crimes are, on average, more dangerous than
their counterpart crimes without bias, it would seem that specific de
terrence could be achieved more directly through increased punish
ment of crimes actually involving physical injuries. Furthermore, an
individual's potential dangerousness is a function of both the
dangerousness of the crime and of the likelihood of an individual's
committing a crime. Lawrence presents neither direct nor circumstan
tial evidence that bias criminals have an especially high rate of recidi
vism. While a term in prison is unlikely to negate the many factors
that lead a person to commit a bias crime, the rehabilitative effects of
prison are undoubtedly weak for many classes of offenders. Those
who commit crimes motivated by the need to support a drug habit, the
dislike of authority°, religious conviction, uncontrollable anger, or
deep-seated alienation are likely in need of specific deterrence.
There remains the claim that "the desire to address a crime that
has a particularly injurious effect on the victim, the targeted group,
and the society at large" (p. 106) constitutes a nonpretextual reason
for bias-crime laws. These particularly injurious effects are undoubt
edly central to the case for bias-crime laws. Let me, however, suggest
three reasons to doubt that their invocation is anything more than a
convenient pretext.
First, racism and other varieties of bigotry are disfavored ideolo
gies in our society. In some individuals, these forms of bias exist as no
more than unarticulated or barely conscious prompting. A man who
chooses his seat on the bus to avoid sitting next to a person of a differ
ent color need not subscribe to a racist "ideology." Those who are
subject to prosecution under bias-crime laws, however, are often ex
tremists who ascribe to coherent, if baseless, theories of racism, intol
erance, and bigotry. Lawrence himself characterizes these forms of
bias as an ideology, and indeed, makes their status as an ideology an
essential element in the justification of their prohibition (pp. 11-12).
Bias-crime laws today are thus analogous to a hypothetical Cold War

46. Furthermore, while the end of stemming the rising rate of bias crimes may be a con
stitutionally legitimate one, it cannot justify, from a deontological perspective, more severe
punishment. From a deontological perspective, the perpetrator's personal desert, not her
membership in a contingently expanding class of like perpetrators, must dictate the punish
ment. Lawrence does not set for himself the goal of developing a unified justification of
bias-crime laws consistent with both deontological constraints and the Constitution. Such a
justification, however, would be more intellectually satisfying than the diverse moral and
constitutional justifications Lawrence presen�.
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era law providing enhanced penalties for crimes "motivated by
Marxism." Such a hypothetical law might be defended based on the
particularly great injuries that Marxist-motivated crimes arguably tend
to produce (economic instability, pervasive suspicion and fear, reac
tionary responses, etc.). In light of its facial targeting of an unpopular
ideology, any such defense should be greeted with some degree of
skepticism, if not heightened scrutiny. The same skepticism is appro
priate for the rationales Lawrence advances in support of bias crimes.
Second, these harm-based rationales are not the ones that actually
explain the enactment of bias-crime laws. The "desire to address a
crime that has a particularly injurious effect" (p. 106) suggests a con
sequential desire to do something about a particularly virulent social
problem. According to Lawrence, however, "[t]he rhetoric surround
ing the enactment of bias-crime laws suggests that most supporters of
such legislation espouse a thoroughly deontological justification"
based on the bias criminal's greater culpability for violating "the
equality principle" (p. 61). This deontological justification undercuts
the harm-based justifications Lawrence advances. .
Finally, Lawrence himself seems to be motivated by concerns other
than the harms to the victim, her group, and society that bias crimes
allegedly cause. The most telling evidence that these concerns are
pretextual is perhaps the very language of Lawrence's model bias
crime law. Lawrence's model statute establishes three means of com
mitting a bias crime. Under the model statute, a person is guilty of a
first-degree bias crime if he commits any crime "with the knowledge
that . . . his conduct will be perceived . . . [as] motivated . . . by ill
will . . . due to the . . . race, color [or] religion . . . of the victim" (p. 170;
emphasis added). A person is guilty of a second-degree bias crime if
he commits any crime "with conscious disregard for the substantial and
unjustifiable risk that his conduct will be perceived . . . [as] moti
vated . . . by ill will . . . due to the . . . race, color [or] religion . . . of
the victim" (p. 171; emphasis added). Given the Model Penal Code's
well-known purpose-knowledge-recklessness-negligence culpability
scheme, one naturally would expect that the third way of committing a
bias crime would be acting with the purpose that such action would be
perceived as based on bias.47 Such a provision would be consistent
with the harm-based justification of bias-crime laws, which looks to
the impact of the perception of bias. In fact, the third way to commit a
bias crime under Lawrence's statute is to commit any crime "moti
vated . . . by ill will . . . due to the . . . race, color, [or] religion . . . of the
victim" (p. 170).
By including a provision that focuses on the motivation itself, as
opposed to consistently addressing the perception of the actor's con47. Lawrence believes that permitting liability based on mere negligence improperly
would minimize the gravity of bias crimes. P. 73.
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duct, Lawrence's model law is underinclusive with respect to the
harms that allegedly ground it. Lawrence's model law fails to cover
those who act with the purpose of causing the mistaken perception of
a biased crime. For example, outside the scope of Lawrence's model
statute would be the Protective Property Owner and the Misleading
Arsonist. The Protective Property Owner is a racially tolerant person
who is afraid that if minorities come to live in his neighborhood, the
property value of his house will diminish significantly, and thus, for
purely economic reasons, he, out of desperation, dents the fender of
his minority neighbor's car hoping that his neighbor will interpret this
as racially biased and leave the neighborhood, but lacking the belief
that there is a substantial likelihood that his act will be so interpreted.
The Misleading Arsonist is an arsonist who, before destroying a com
petitor's store, paints a swastika on the property on the off-chance the
arson will be attributed to a hate group and the ensuing investigation
will be directed away from him. Though the Protective Property
Owner and the Misleading Arsonist intend to cause the relevant
harms, they slip through the model statute.
Likewise, by shifting from a focus on perception to motivation,
Lawrence's model law is overinclusive with respect to the harms that
allegedly ground it. Lawrence specifically considers the case of a per
son who conceals his bias motivation from the victim and her commu
nity so that "no one might even suspect t)lat it was a bias crime" (p.
67). Thus, he assumes that "the actor . . . has not caused the objective
harms associated with bias crimes" (p. 67). Lawrence labels such a
person "The Clever Bias Criminal" (p. 65). If the harm-based justifi
cations advanced by Lawrence were actually at work, one would ex
pect the Clever Bias Criminal not to be subject to any additional pun
ishment based on his underlying motives. Not only has he caused no
additional harm, but because he has no reason to believe that his se
cretly bias-motivated crime will result in additional harm, the Clever
Bias Criminal is no more blameworthy than a person who merely
commits a parallel crime. Yet Lawrence's model bias-crime law, by
permitting liability to be triggered by bias motivation alone, explicitly
is formulated to reach the Clever Bias Criminal. 48
In general, Lawrence displays admirable sensitivity to the subtle
ties and reach of the language of bias-crime laws. Lawrence clearly
recognizes that there is a logical gap between his harm-based justifica
tions of bias-crime laws and his motivation-based formulations of bias
crime laws (p. 64). Lawrence, however, does not even consider trying
to minimize that gap through statutes that directly address the harms
48. P. 170. Inexplicably, Lawrence states that the Clever Bias Criminal is guilty of an
attempted bias crime. P. 67. Under all actual bias-crime laws, as well as Lawrence's model
law, he would be liable for committing a bias crime, assuming that he completed an
underlying crime.
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associated with bias crimes. For example, statutes might create en
hanced penalties where:
1. The offender acted with the specific intent to create (or with knowl
edge that he was likely to create) terror within a definable community.
2. The offender acted with specific intent to create (or with knowledge
that he was likely to create) a threat of further crime.

3. The offender knew or should have known that a victim was particu
larly susceptible to the criminal conduct.
4.

The offender, in the commission of the offense, intended to inflict se
rious emotional distress.
The commission of the offense created serious psychological harm
(comparable to 'serious physical harm' specifications that enhance penal
ties).

5.

6.

The offender acted with specific intent to interfere with another's ex
ercise of constitutional or statutory rights, or another's enjoyment of or
access to public facilities, or another's enjoyment of equal opportunity.49

Nor does Lawrence even consider a statute that consistently focuses
on only conduct creating the perception of bias motivation. Such a
statute would seem to be more consistent with the harm-based justifi
cations Lawrence advances. These facts appear to undercut the sin
cerity of Lawrence's proffered rationales.
What does Lawrence really have in mind when he speaks of "the
desire to address a crime that has a particularly injurious effect" (p.
106)? Surprisingly nowhere in his book does he directly advance the
claim that bias-crime laws will reduce the number of bias crimes or the
harms associated with them. Such a claim would require complicated
empirical argument concerning the causes and effects of bias crime
that outstrips the current data.50 By "address" Lawrence means some
thing other than "prevent." Only in the final chapter of the book, en
titled "Why Punish Hate," far away from his First Amendment discus
sion, does Lawrence reveal his true grounds for believing bias-crime
laws are desirable (as opposed to merely permissible (p. 161)). In
voking an expressive theory of punishment, Lawrence writes that
"[t]he punishment of bias crimes is necessary for the full expression of
commitment to the American values of equality of treatment and op
portunity" (p. 169). Lawrence appears to believe that such expression
has both a noninstrumental symbolic value and also some consequen
tialist aspect for law-abiding citizens (pp. 166-67), but his discussion in
this regard is lofty and abstract. Unfortunately, Lawrence does not

49. Susan Gellman, Hate Crime Laws Are Thought Crime Laws, 199211993 ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 509, 511 (proposing penalty enhancement for those situations) (footnotes omitted).
50. The success of bias-crime laws in deterring bias crimes is unknown. See Staff, supra
note 2, at 64 (finding that the impact of bias-crime laws on bias crime is "relatively inconclu
sive" and conclusions are "difficult to draw").
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address whether expressing opposition to an ideology is a legitimate
motive for enhancing criminal sanctions for conduct based on the ide
ology. Could Marxist-motivated crime (or speech) be punished more
severely simply because our society wants to express its objection to
Marxism? Surely not. Relying on an expressive theory of punishment
to justify content-based punishment seems far too easy a path to
content-based criminal laws. Lawrence writes that "[e]xpressive the
ory may be concerned less with providing a full justification of pun
ishment than with understanding the full impact of the punishment"
(p. 167). But if the expressive theory is the key to understanding why
a state "should" (p. 161) have bias-crime laws, and non-pretextual rea
sons determine constitutionality, its validity deserves closer scrutiny.
B.

Bias-Crime Laws and Motives

At the end of Chapter Five, Lawrence considers an additional First
Amendment argument raised against bias-crime statutes: the argu
ment that bias-crime laws violate the First Amendment because they
criminalize motives (pp. 106-09). Lawrence rejects the argument in
part because he considers the distinction between motives (which al
legedly should not bear on liability) and intent (which obviously may)
to be only a "formal" distinction bearing no substantive weight. Spe
cifically, Lawrence believes that motives are definitionally just inten
tions that have not been established by the positive law as bearing on
liability. Insofar as bias-crime laws establish that bias is relevant to li
ability, bias becomes an intention and is indistinguishable from other
intentions the law may properly criminalize.
Lawrence writes,
"[w]hether bias-crime laws punish motivation or intent is not inherent
in those prohibitions. Rather, the distinction simply mirrors the way
in which we choose to describe them" (p. 109). Thus, Lawrence con
cludes, the motive-based argument against bias crimes cannot get off
the ground.
While I do not subscribe to tJie proposition that the First
Amendment contains an absolute prohibition against the criminaliza
tion of motives, I believe there is more to the intent/motive distinction
than Lawrence recognizes. Lawrence is correct that many uncontro
versial criminal law doctrines could be characterized as criminalizing
motives. Burglary could be reformulated as trespassing with the mo
tive to commit a felony on the unlawfully entered premises; the de
fense of necessity (or putative necessity) could be reformulated as
committing a crime with the motive to avoid a greater evil; attempted
homicide could be reformulated as acting with the motive of causing
death. The much-repeated maxim against punishing motives, how-
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ever, is not dismissed so easily. There is a core of truth to it.51 As il
lustrated above, the motivations relevant to criminal law share a
common quality: they directly reflect the perpetrator's intent to
achieve a significant social harm or good beyond that associated with
the prohibited conduct. In H.L.A. Hart's terminology, they are "fur
ther intention[s]."52 In contrast, the criminal law has virtually never
found relevant to liability motives that directly reflect only a further
intent to achieve a socially insignificant end, such as the demonstration
of manhood, the satisfaction of a material desire, the elimination of a
romantic rival, the obtaining of funds to pay a personal debt, and so
on.53 The irrelevance of such intentions to liability is the maxim's core
of truth. Thus, contra Lawrence, the maxim embodies more than a
"formal" requirement - it reflects a substantive distinction between
mental states that would make the actor accountable for significant
social harms or benefits and those that would not.54 Bias falls in the
latter category. To act from bias is not logically equivalent to acting
with the further intent to humiliate the victim, to spread fear through
the victim's community, to provoke a race war,55 or to achieve any
other result, much less achieve a significant further social harm. Be
cause bias-crime laws cannot be reformulated as prohibiting criminal
conduct with the intent of achieving any further socially significant
harm, they are contrary to the core truth of the general rule that
criminal law does not punish motives.56 Thus, even if the criminaliza
tion of motive is not per se offensive to the First Amendment, the ar
gument may not be dismissed as easily as Lawrence suggests.57

51. As George Fletcher has written:
At one level, the claim that motives do not typically bear on criminal liability is a technical
point about the way offenses are usually defined. But there is also a deeper point suggested
by the claim that the actor's ultimate purposes do not bear on his or her culpability for
criminal conduct.
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 452 (1979).
52. H.L A. Hart, Intention and Punishment, 4 OXFORD REV. (1967), reprinted in H.L.A.
HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILITY: EsSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, 117-18
(1968).
53. A narrow exception is MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.5 (1962), which provides that "[a]
person commits a misdemeanor if, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of
himself or of any person other than his spouse, he exposes his genitals under circumstances in
which he knows his conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm.") (emphasis added). The
provision would seem more just and effective if the italicized language concerning motiva
tion were removed.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 9-15.
55. Cf. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 949-51 (1983) (holding that a desire to start a
race war may be relevant to several statutory aggravating factors).
56. Cf. Douglas N. Husak, Motive and Criminal Liability, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS,
WINTER/SPRING 1989, at 3; Paul H. Robins, Hate Crimes: Crimes of Motive, Character, or
Group Terror? 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 605, 606-09.
57. In a recent article, Carol S. Steiker argues that criminalizing bias is consistent with
the criminal law's general treatment of motive. See Carol S. Steiker, Punishing Hateful Mo.
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In sum, Lawrence's First Amendment defense succeeds in going a
long way on very little. Abjuring the problematic distinctions between
conduct and speech and between motive and ideology, Lawrence rests
his case on a variety of relatively value-neutral, harm-based policy
ends, such as protecting victims, their community, and society at large
from injuries analogous to those caused by verbal assaults and men
acing. Such an approach, if legally sound, still invites suspicion. Its
empirical foundation in rising bias-crime rates, future dangerousness
of bias criminals, and deterability of bias crimes is weak; its air of be
ing motivated by hostility to a disfavored ideology is strong. Never
theless, to anyone ·dissatisfied with the Supreme Court's treatment of
the issue in Mitchell, Lawrence's account offers an alternative ap
proach with appeal and potential.
Ill. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN PROSECUTING
BIAS CRIMES
The final major topic that Lawrence considers is the federal gov
ernment's role in prosecuting bias crimes. Because there are currently
no federal laws prohibiting bias crimes per se, a compelling argument
for the expansion of the federal government into this area would be a
significant contribution to an open policy issue.
In this regard,
Punishing Hate presents a generally persuasive, if not fully developed,
case that the federal government should enact bias-crime laws and
play some role in their enforcement.58
Lawrence organizes his discussion of the federal prosecution of
bias crimes around three questions: the constitutional, the prudential
tives: Old Wine in a New Bottle Revives Calls for Prohibition, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1857 (1999)
(book review). She argues that all or many determinations of the criminal law to make mo
tive relevant are "political to the core" in just the way the bias-crime laws allegedly are. Id.
at 1866 (citations omitted). She offers the example of the manslaughter provocation doc
trine according to which consuming passion caused by the discovery of infidelity is partially
exculpatory. See id. at 1863. In contrast, Streiker notes, consuming passion caused by the
discovery of one's daughter in bed with a man of another race will not be exculpatory. See
id. at 1865. If this distinction between motives is not thought objectionable, why should the
enhancement of a penalty due to bias be objectionable? The answer is that the manslaugh
ter example involves the intention to kill and the further intention to revenge an act of adul
tery. This further intention is one that is considered socially valid, or at least "understand
able." This assessment of the further intention undeniably involves a value judgment: the
judgment that one's status as an adulterer is, at least arguably, morally relevant. In contrast,
the status of being Asian-American, for example, is not morally relevant. Thus, to act based
on bias is worse than to act based on the discovery of infidelity, which may mitigate culpa
bility. But it is not worse than other "generic" motivations, like envy, which involve no so
cially acceptable further intentions.

58. The issue of whether the federal government should enact and enforce bias-crime
laws is, of course, logically independent from the question, addressed in Part I, whether such
laws are justified. The latter question concerned the appropriate penalty level for bias
crimes. Assuming it were appropriate for the federal government to enact bias-crime laws,
those laws could impose penalties that were either equal to or greater than the penalties for
parallel crimes in the same jurisdiction.
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and the pragmatic. With respect to the first question - Congress's
constitutional authority to enact bias-crime laws - Lawrence's discus
sion would benefit from greater depth. Lawrence concedes that the
Commerce Clause is "a poor[] fit" (p. 152) and the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments are inadequate bases for a federal bias-crime
law because of the state-action requirement (p. 153). This leaves the
Thirteenth Amendment as the remaining potential source for the
authority to regulate bias crimes. The Thirteenth Amendment, by its
terms, expressly prohibits only slavery and involuntary servitude; bias
crimes are neither. The Amendment's Enabling Clause, however, has
been interpreted broadly to permit legislation to eradicate so-called
"badges and incidents" of slavery.59 Following such broad interpreta
tion, racially motivated violence against African Americans could be
deemed a badge or incidence of slavery because the hostility produc
ing such violence can be traced to the fact that African Americans
were once the subjects of slavery in this country. Bias crimes against
African Americans, however, have composed only about forty percent
of reported bias crimes.60
Lawrence's Thirteenth Amendment arguments for the constitu
tionality of bias-crime laws that reach beyond the protection of
African Americans are comparatively weak. Lawrence notes that in
the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court suggested that the
Thirteenth Amendment would prohibit "Mexican peonage" and
"Chinese coolie labor systems."61 The Thirteenth Amendment un
doubtedly covers the actual slavery of all people both de jure and de
facto, and, perhaps, analogous institutions such as the forced prostitu
tion of illegal immigrants, as well as the badges and incidents thereof.
It seems a stretch, however, to claim it covers discrete bias-motivated
acts of violence against groups that have no history of subjugation in
the United States. Lawrence asserts that modem cases have extended
the Thirteen Amendment's protections to religious groups (p. 154).
The cases he cites in support of this proposition,62 however, only ad
dressed the scope of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982. The Court made no
reference to their roots in the Thirteenth Amendment. Furthermore,
in those cases, the Court stated that discrimination based solely on re59. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968); The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
60. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES: 1998, at 215 tbl.344 (118th ed. 1998).
61. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72 (1873) (noting that such systems would have
to develop into slavery of those races).
62. See Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987) (holding that a person
of Arabian ancestry may be protected from racial discrimination under § 1981); Shaare
Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987) (holding that because Jews were consid
ered a distinct race they may assert claims under § 1982).
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ligion or place of origin was not within the scope of section 1981.63
These cases are slender reeds to support his position.
In the end, Lawrence's call for this expansion of the Thirteenth
Amendment seems to rest on the following passage:
The broad reach of the Thirteenth Amendment as understood today
goes beyond a prohibition of re-enslavement of those who have previ
ously been enslaved. By protecting ethnic, religious, and national-origin
minority groups, the Thirteenth Amendment is now more consonant
with a positive guarantee of freedom and equal participation in civil soci
ety. Violence, directed against an individual out of motive of group bias,
violates this concept . . . . " [p. 154; footnote omitted]

This argument, in my view, is too facile and abstract, resting more on
wishful thinking and an assumed shared understanding of "a positive
guarantee of freedom and equal participation," than on solid legal
authority and analysis. Lawrence devotes thirty-six pages to reviewing
this country's convoluted history of federal civil rights enforcement
(pp. 113-49). Given this introduction, one would expect greater atten
tion to the substantive constitutional question at issue. While there is
room to argue that the Thirteenth Amendment might support broad
bias-crime legislation,64 Lawrence does not make that argument con
vincingly.
Lawrence's discussion of the prudential and pragmatic questions
relating to the federal bias crime prosecution is more persuasive, even
if its practical significance is less than clear. Lawrence argues that
there is a strong federal interest in supplementing states' historically
lax prosecution of bias crimes, because racial equality is an important
component of the "national social contract" (pp. 155-57). Lawrence
advocates neither a massive federal "war" against bias crimes nor a
barrage of dual state-federal prosecutions. Rather, he envisions a pro
cess in which "federal and state law enforcement work together, par
ticularly at the investigatory stage, and then, when it comes time to de
termine which criminal charges are to be brought, the merits of each
are weighed" (p. 160). Such a relationship, Lawrence believes, might
resemble that between federal and state authorities in the area of po
lice brutality prosecutions (p. 158). Would such a relationship work in
practice? Lawrence thinks that local-federal turf battles are avoidable
(p. 160). He, however, does not address the issues of whether dual ju
risdiction over bias crimes might result in buck passing between local
63. See, e.g., Saint Francis College, 481 U.S. at 613 ("If respondent on remand can prove
that he was subjected to intentional discrimination based on the fact that he was born an
Arab, rather than solely on the place or nation of his origin, or his religion, he will have
made out a case under § 1981.").
64. See, e.g., Peter Brandon Bayer, Rationality - and The Irrational Underinclusiveness
ofthe Civil Rights Laws, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 67 n.214 (1988); G. Sidney Buchanan,
The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12 Hous. L. REV. 1,
7-15 (1974).
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and federal authorities or unduly complicate investigations. Nor does
he consider whether it is a sound expenditure of limited federal re
sources to prosecute the typical bias crime involving minor property
damage or personal injury. Likely, Lawrence would rely on the
Justice Department to intelligently assess these matters before in
volving itself. It is difficult to object to the grant of power where the
use of that power will be guided by intelligent discretion. Still, one
wonders whether Lawrence's call for the federal prosecution of bias
crimes is a proposal for a significant policy change with large-scale re
percussions or merely for a symbolic expansion of federal authority
with a negligible impact. Just as it is difficult to assess the validity of
bias-crime laws without knowing the amount of the proposed penalty
enhancements, it is difficult to assess the practicality of federal bias
crime enforcement without knowing the amount of the proposed ac
tivity.
CONCLUSION

Punishing Hate presents a well-organized and coherent defense of
bias-crime laws. Nevertheless, it at points appears to reflect an unre
solved tension in the thinking of the defenders of bias-crime laws.
This tension is best exemplified by Lawrence's model bias-crime law.
This law authorizes additional punishment based on the existence of
bias, as well as the appearance, or perception, thereof. The latter con
dition ties into the harm-based rationales for bias-crime laws that in
form most of Lawrence's defense of bias-crime laws. The appearance
of bias is the more proximate cause of the harms associated with bias
crimes since these harms follow from actual bias only insofar as the
bias is perceived. It is, however, the former condition - the triggering
of punishment by bias itself - that most raises the hackles of those
who oppose bias-crime laws. The most likely explanation for going
further and criminalizing motive is that only such a provision would
make a statement directly against bias. It is doubtful that a hypotheti
cal bill targeting "the appearance of a bias-motivated crime" would
gamer significant legislative support. Rather, one suspects, only inso
far as bias-crime bills can be understood as striking at racism, intoler
ance, and bigotry, will they be elevated to law. Indeed, Lawrence's
desire to be seen as striking at racism, intolerance, and bigotry itself
may explain Lawrence's repeated statements that bias crimes are nec
essarily matters of motive65 - a claim plainly inconsistent with
Lawrence's model statute, which permits liability based on merely the
perception of motive irrespective of actual motive.
65. Lawrence begins his book by defining a bias crime as "a crime committed as an act
of prejudice," p. 9, and later reasserts, after lengthy analysis, that "precisely what we are
punishing" with bias·crime laws is "conduct grounded in racial animus." P. 79.
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One senses in Punishing Hate a mild form of schizophrenia. On
the one hand, Lawrence frequently adheres to a safe liberal/libertarian
defense of bias-crime laws that turns on the harms that are produced
contingently when bias-motivated acts are perceived as such. In this
light, bias-crime laws are little more controversial than laws prohibit
ing menacing, verbal assault, or other plainly unprotected expression.
On the other hand, Lawrence sometimes presents a more politically
correct, but philosophically problematic position that bias motivation,
and the objectionable values that inform it, are the evils that must be
driven from our society. This sentiment arises both in the context of
Lawrence's deontological justification of bias-crime laws as well as in
the final chapter of Punishing Hate where Lawrence advances his ex
pressive account of bias-crime laws untethered to the claim that they
will reduce the number of bias crimes.
Perhaps my diagnosis is too strong. Perhaps it is legitimate to
point to the harms contingently associated with bias crimes when re
sponding to fastidious punishment theorists or zealous First
Amendment advocates and to point to symbolic importance of equal
ity when addressing an audience prone to reading appealing values
into bias-crime laws. But an expressive account of bias-crime laws
adds little to the debate. If bias-crime laws are not supported ade
quately by harm-based arguments, but trammel on First Amendment
values, enacting them expresses a lack of respect for those First
Amendment values. Conversely, if bias-crime laws are justified on
harm-based grounds, then enacting them in an open society expresses
the exact values underlying those grounds, such as the evil of humili
ating another, not the ideal of equality. Ultimately, the place of bias
crime laws in our society must tum on the validity of those harm
based defenses that Lawrence so well identifies, not the importance of
equality as an abstract ideal that Lawrence so elegantly articulates.

